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Abstract
This paper studies optimal monetary and scal policy in a small open economy.
Two forces in the economy impose orthogonal restrictions on nancing costs across
governments. The rst force requires constant nancing costs across governments to
have time consistent optimal policy of hours. The second force always asks for time-
varying nancing costs across governments in order to have time consistency optimal
policy of consumption and real money balances. Thus, optimal monetary and scal
policy is time inconsistent. However, if preferences (and/or productivity) satisfy certain
conditions, the former force disappears and optimal monetary and scal policy becomes
time consistent. The results hold with both exible exchange rate regimes and xed
exchange rate regimes. The latter indicates that a credible xed exchange rate regime
does not help render optimal policy time consistent.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the time consistency property of optimal monetary and scal policy
(hereafter OMFP) in a small open economy, where the meaning of OMFP follows the tra-
dition of Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al. (1991) in the sense that the Ramsey
government maximizes the utility of households by choosing the least distortional monetary
and scal policy.1 In line with the literature, whether OMFP is time consistent depends on
whether a government could use policy instruments to inuence its successor's policy choices
in such a way that the successor will follow the policy continuation of real allocations [Al-
varez et al. (2004) among others].2 The discussion on time consistency could be traced back
to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), which have shown that when
it has the opportunity to reoptimize monetary and scal policy, the Ramsey government will
have the incentive to renege on those policies made by the previous governments.
This paper is motivated by several observations. First, the time consistency issue of
OMFP is empirically relevant. It has been argued that time inconsistency is an important
reason for ination bias [Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983)] and -
nancial crises because of the associated self-fullling multiple equilibria [Chari et al. (1998),
Albanesi et al. (2003a)]. For example, Albanesi and Christiano (2001) argue that the dra-
matic output drops in several Asian countries during the 1998 Asian crisis are due to time
inconsistency. Besides, the 2010 sovereign debt crisis in Greece provides one more example
indicating the importance and empirical relevance of the time consistency issue in a small
open economy.
Second, whether OMFP is time consistent is also an important theoretical question and
thus widely studied. In the general equilibrium framework, the literature has identied one
commitment technology to guarantee time consistency in a closed economy: an appropriate
maturity structure of public debt. Lucas and Stokey (1983) show that the Ramsey gov-
1The forward-looking component (not necessarily stochastic) has a non-negligible impact on OMFP here.
The condition rules out the cases in which OMFP is solely determined by the contemporaneous state, for
example, the ones discussed in Albanesi and Christiano (2001) and Albanesi et al. (2003b).
2In line with Alvarez et al. (2004), policy instruments are dened as multiple-period bond holding posi-
tions; and policy choices are dened as nominal interest rates and tax rates in the case of exible exchange
rate regimes and as tax rates in the case of xed exchange rate regimes.
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ernment in a closed economy can choose the right maturity structure of real public debt
to neutralize the renege incentive of the next government; and as a result, optimal scal
policy will be time consistent.3 Building on the work of Persson et al. (1987) and Calvo
and Obstfeld (1990), both Alvarez et al. (2004) and Persson et al. (2006) impose additional
restrictions to the model in Lucas and Stokey (1983) to neutralize the incentive of using
surprising ination to nance public spending, a phenomenon that was formally analyzed in
Calvo (1978); and then show OMFP is time consistent in such a closed economy.
Third, it is still, however, an open question whether OMFP is time consistent in a
small open economy for several reasons. First, monetary policy in a small open economy
is aected by the choice of the foreign exchange rate regime (hereafter FERR). Second, a
small open economy has conicting features with respect to time consistency, comparing to
the closed economy studied in Alvarez et al. (2004) and Persson et al. (2006). For example,
the government of a small open economy does not have any control over real interest rates;
which means that the government has fewer policy choices (of its successor) to inuence.
According to Tinbergen (1956), this feature will help render optimal policy time consistent.
On the other hand, real bonds with dierent maturity dates become ineective, which implies
that the government has fewer policy instruments to use. This feature will decrease the
government's ability of rendering time consistent OMFP. The net eect on time consistency
is thus an open question.
This paper lls the gap by extending the discussion of time consistent OMFP to a small
open economy with perfect capital mobility. In this paper, we follow the literature by
looking for the sucient condition for time consistency, i.e., whether there exists a maturity
structure of public and external debt such that the Ramsey outcome is invariant to an
ex post reoptimization. When the government chooses a exible FERR, time consistency of
OMFP depends how the labor-leisure choices aect the nancing costs (Lagrange multipliers)
across governments. When the labor-leisure choices impose the constant nancing costs
requirement, OMFP is time inconsistent. This is because the economy always asks for the
3Dierent types of commitment technology have been proposed, such as rules [Kydland and Prescott
(1977)], reputation [Backus and Drill (1985), Tabellini (1985)], \conservative" central banker [Rogo
(1985)], incentive contracts with ination targets [Svensson (1997)].
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time-varying nancing costs across governments in order to have time consistent optimal
policy of consumption and real money balances. In this case, there does not exist a maturity
structure that could simultaneously satisfy both requirements.
However, when preferences and/or productivity processes satisfy certain conditions, the
labor-leisure choices will not impose the constant nancing costs requirement, and OMFP will
be time consistent. In this case, there exist many maturity structures of external and public
debt (both real and nominal), including ones over nite horizons, capable of rendering OMFP
time consistent. This is because the t = 0 government always has more policy instruments
(bonds of dierent maturity dates) than the t = 1 government has policy choices (nominal
interest rates and labor income tax rates).
The same qualitative results hold with a xed FERR. In this case, the monetary economy
eectively reduces to a real economy and the aforementioned two forces still exist. Thus,
unless preferences and/or productivity processes satisfy certain conditions, the labor market
imposes a dierent restriction on nancing costs from the good market. As a result, OMFP is
time inconsistent even if the xed FERR itself is credible. Alternatively, the government does
not have sucient policy instruments to inuence the policy choices of the next government,
as argued in Persson and Svensson (1986). This is a new and interesting result. It extends
the existing understanding about the relationship between a credible xed FERR and time
consistency: according to Kydland and Prescott (1977), rules such as a credible xed FERR
will assure time consistency of monetary policy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discuss time consistency of OMFP with a
exible FERR. Section 3 discusses the same problem with a xed FERR. Section 4 presents
the relation between our results to those in the literature. And Section 5 concludes.
2 Time Inconsistency under A Flexible FERR
The recent nding in Persson et al. (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2004) shows that the time in-
consistent incentive could be neutralized in a general equilibrium model of a closed economy.
We check whether a similar conclusion, the time-inconsistent incentive in a small open econ-
omy with the exible FERR could be neutralized by choosing the right maturity structure
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of public debt, can be obtained.
2.1 The Model
The model is a perfect foresight model, which is simple but sucient to illustrate the main
point of the paper. In addition, the model is a small open economy version of that in Persson
et al. (2006). In order to be as close as possible to models in the literature, we assume that
the government does not impose import/export duties or subsidies.
2.1.1 Households
In this economy, households are given the price of consumption good, pt, the present value
in period 0 of goods in period t, qt, the labor income tax rate, t, and the nominal interest
rate it+1. A representative household chooses the time prole of consumption, ct; t  0, real
money balances, mt+1; t  1, and hours, ht; t  0, to maximize its lifetime utility:
1X
t=0
tu (ct;mt; ht) ;
where  denotes the subjective discount factor, which weights the consumption bundles over
time. The household is subject to its period budget constraints and the no-Ponzi game
condition, both of which will be given below. Here we restrict the discussion to the case in
which the period utility function is separable, u(c;m; h) = u(c)+v(m)+g(h). The separable
preferences assumption is arbitrary. We introduce this assumption in order to discuss the
time consistency problem in a simple model and our practice is in line with the literature
[Persson et al. (2006)]. In addition to usual concavity assumption of the utility function,
we further assume that umt  0. In other words, nominal interest rates, it, are always
non-negative.
We assume Svensson timing of markets: the good market meets before the nancial mar-
ket [Svensson (1985)] in one period. Thus, real money balances are dened as mt =
Mt 1
pt
,
where M denotes the nominal money balance. There are two reasons behind the use of
Svensson timing. First, it introduces an ination cost in the absence of price stickiness:
when the price level increases, real money balances are reduced, and the household receives
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less utility from the given level of nominal money balances. This is in line with facts: Pers-
son et al. (1996) show that high ination has large and well-known social costs. Another
rationale for the use of the beginning of period money balance is that ination forces house-
holds to economize money thus bringing costs to holding money [Bailey (1956) and Tower
(1971)]. The third rationale is that it gives the government more exibility, compared to
the use of Lucas timing, in choosing the maturity structure of public debt to guarantee time
consistency.4 In particular, both Persson et al. (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2004) show OMFP
is time consistent in a closed economy. However, time consistency requires that nominal
public debt in each maturity period be zero in Alvarez et al. (2004) because Lucas timing is
assumed; while it does not have such a requirement in Persson et al. (2006) because Svensson
timing is assumed.
The representative household's period budget constraint is given by:
qt

(1  t)wtht + Mt 1
pt

+
1X
s=t
qs

t 1bPs +
t 1BPs
ps

 qt

ct +
Mt
pt

+
1X
s=t+1
qs

tb
P
s +
tB
P
s
ps

: (1)
The variable qt denotes the price of net claims issued in period t,
 
tb
P
s

. It immediately
follows that we apply the same discount factors on both internal and external bonds. The
superscript P means that the bond is held by the households.
 
t 1bPs

denotes the net claims
by the domestic household when entering period t on the amount of goods to be delivered in
period s. (t 1BPs ) denotes the net claims on money to be delivered in period s. These bonds
are real in this small open economy because their purchasing power will not change when the
domestic price level changes. The sum
P1
s=t qs

t 1bPs +
t 1BPs
ps

denotes the representative
household's initial bond holding position.
The no-Ponzi game condition for the representative household is given by:
lim
j!1
"
qt+j
Mt+j
pt+j
+
1X
s=t+j+1
qs

t+jb
P
s +
t+jB
P
s
ps
#
 0; 8t  0: (2)
4With Lucas timing, the nancial market meets before the good market in the same period [Lucas and
Stokey (1987)].
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This condition has its usual meaning: the representative household has to keep non-negative
nancial assets in the limit. This condition must hold in each period. In this economy,
nominal interest rates are dened as:
1
1 + it+1
=
qt+1=pt+1
qt=pt
 1; t  0: (3)
Note that when the government commits to a xed FERR, it will be exogenous determined.
When the government commits to a exible FERR, it could be chosen by the government.
Combining the period budget constraint and the no-Ponzi game condition, we write the
inter-temporal budget constraint of the representative household, Eq. (4), as:
1X
t=0
qt [(1  t)wtht +t] + M 1
p0
+
1X
t=0
qt

 1bPt +
 1BPt
pt

=
1X
t=0
qtct +
1X
t=1
qtmtit:
(4)
As a standard result in the literature (the derivation is available upon request), it can be
shown that the time sequences for fct;mt+1; htg satisfying the constraints (1) and (2) are
the same as those satisfying the single constraint (4). Thus, the representative household
maximizes lifetime utility subject to the single constraint (4). Let  denote the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with Eq. (4). The optimality conditions for the domestic household
are the single inter-temporal budget constraint (4) and
tuct = qt; t  0 (5)
t = 1 +
1
wt
uht
uct
; t  0 (6)
it+1 =
umt+1
uct+1
; t  0: (7)
All the optimality conditions have their usual meanings: Eq. (5) says that the marginal
utility of consumption should equal the marginal cost of consumption; Eq. (6) shows that
the introduction of labor income tax distorts the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and hours; and Eq. (7) states that there is cost to holding money.
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2.1.2 Competitive rms
In each period, competitive rms use constant returns-to-scale technology in production:
yt = ztht; t  0:
Here zt denotes the total factor productivity. It can be either constant over time or time-
varying, but not stochastic. One point worth mentioning is the possibility of zero output
in this small open economy. There are several ways to rule out that possibility. One way
is to assume that the net foreign asset accumulated by the representative household is not
large enough so that the household will work at the given real wage rate in each period.
Another way is to assume decreasing returns-to-scale technology as in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003). As a result, marginal product of labor at low levels of labor input is extremely
high and the possibility of a corner solution is ruled out. However, in this case, rms will
have non-zero prots which should be taxed. Such prot taxes will inevitably complicate
the discussion of the time consistency of OMFP. To simplify the discussion, we assume the
former way. In a closed economy, zero-output is not an issue because consumption, a part
of output, is always positive with standard preferences.
We assume that output is sold in both domestic and international markets so that the
\law of one price" for one tradable good holds in each period:
pt = Stp
??
t ; t  0; (8)
where the variable St denotes the nominal exchange rate at time t and the variable p
??
t
denotes the world price at time t. Firms maximize prot, which is given by:
t = ztht   wtht; t  0: (9)
The optimality condition for labor demand is given by:
wt = zt; t  0: (10)
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Eq. (10) is a standard optimality condition in the rms' prot maximization problem.
2.1.3 The government
The government nances its expenditures, gt by levying labor income taxes at the rate of t,
by printing money and by trading multi-period nominal and real bonds with both domestic
households and international investors. In this paper, we focus on the scenario in which gt is
time-varying, an assumption maintained throughout the paper. The monetary/scal regime
consists of plans for the policy instruments: money and bonds; and for the policy choices:
nominal interest rates and labor income tax rates. Here we assume that lump-sum taxes
are not available to the government, a standard assumption in the literature [Alvarez et al.
(2004) and Persson et al. (2006)]. The period budget constraint of the government is thus
given by:
qt

gt +
Mt 1
pt

+
1X
s=t
qs

t 1bGs +
t 1BGs
ps

 qt

twtht +
Mt
pt

(11)
+
1X
s=t+1
qs

tb
G
s +
tB
G
s
ps

:
The superscript G means that the bond is issued by the government. The variable
 
t 1bGs

denotes total net claims on the amount of goods to be delivered by the government in period
s. The variable (t 1BGs ) denotes the net claims on money to be delivered by the government
in period s.
The no-Ponzi game condition for the government is given by:
lim
j!1
"
qt+j
Mt+j
pt+j
+
1X
s=t+j+1
qs

t+jb
G
s +
t+jB
G
s
ps
#
 0;8t  0: (12)
This condition rules out the possibility that the government borrows innitely to nance its
expenditures. The government's intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
1X
t=0
qt

 1bGt +
 1BGt
pt

+
M 1
p0
=
1X
t=0
qt (twtht   gt) +
1X
t=1
qtitmt: (13)
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2.1.4 International investors
International investors can always borrow and lend at a nominal interest rate of i?? in the
international market. Due to assumption of perfect capital mobility, the uncovered interest
rate parity condition holds:
(1 + it+1) =
St+1
St
(1 + i??) =
1 + i??
1 + ??
pt+1
pt
; t  0: (14)
where ?? denote the ination rate in the world economy.5. The second equality in Eq.
(14) comes from the assumed purchasing power parity condition. In addition, in our simple
model, we assume that

1 + i??
1 + ??
= 1; (15)
Since 1+i
??
1+??
= 1+ r?? where r?? denotes the real interest rate, Eq. (15) is the non-stochastic
steady state version of the standard Euler equation with respect to asset accumulation.
2.1.5 Competitive equilibrium
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is dened as a sequence fct, mt+1, ht, wt, t, qt+1,
pt+1g1t=0, a positive constant , and an initial price level p0 > 0, satisfying Eqs. (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (9), (10), (13), (14), given the initial asset conditions of fM 1, ( 1bPt ), ( 1bGt ); and
( 1BPt ), ( 1B
G
t ), 8t  0g, the exogenous fzt; gtg1t=0, and a sequence of government policies
ft; it+1g1t=0
Equation (3) denes qt+1 given prices and nominal interest rates. Eqs. (4){(7) solve the
domestic household's utility maximization problem. Eqs. (9) and (10) solve the rms' prot
maximization problem. Eq. (13) pins down the initial price level.6 And Eq. (14) pins down
the prices. Given Eq. (15) and the separable utility function assumption, we obtain the
5Even though here i??, p??, and ?? are assumed to constant over time here, our discussion will be the
same when they are time-varying.
6In our simple model, we assume that the initial price level is uniquely determined.
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following:
qt =

1 + ??
1 + i??
t
= t; t  0; (16)
uct = qt=
t = 

1 + ??
1 + i??
t
=t = ; t  0: (17)
Eqs. (16)-(17) essentially show that the discount factors will shrink at the rate of  and
consumption is constant over time. We focus on this simple example because it is sucient
to serve our purpose in discussing time consistency.
Given the nature of the question discussed in the paper, the notation is generally compli-
cated because of the use of maturity structures of public debt and the discussion on Ramsey
equilibrium. It helps clarify the main dierences between two similar models: the small open
economy model in this paper and the closed economy model in Persson et al. (2006). First,
a small open economy, by denition, does not have any inuence on the world real interest
rates, while the government in Persson et al. (2006) can aect the equilibrium real interests
by its policy. This dierence implies dierent policy choices and dierent policy instruments
to governments, thus dierent time consistency property of OMFP.
Second, the small open economy in our model can borrow and lend in the international
bond market to smooth consumption. Thus, the period resource constraint does not neces-
sarily bind in each period in our small open economy model. On the contrary, the period
resource constraint must bind in each period in the Persson et al. (2006) model. As a result,
Persson et al. (2006) can use the binding period resource constraint to substitute leisure out
in order to simplify the optimization problem; while we cannot. More importantly, because
of this dierence, the labor market does not impose any restriction in the discussion of the
time consistency issue in a closed economy; and as a result, Persson et al. (2006) assume
constant productivity without aecting their conclusion. However, it does impose a restric-
tion in our small open economy model and whether productivity is constant or time-varying
matters with respect to time consistency of OMFP in our model. We elaborate this point in
detail in Section 2.3.1.
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2.1.6 Intertemporal constraints
Using the optimality conditions, we can rewrite the government's intertemporal budget
constraint containing only the initial price level, p0, a constant, , real money balances,
fmt+1g1t=0, hours fhtg1t=0, and the maturity structure it inherits from the last period,
 
 1BGt

and
 
 1bGt

:

p0
" 1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BGt

+M 1
#
=
1X
t=0
t

(ztht   gt   1 bGt ) + uhtht

+
1X
t=1
tumtmt;
(18)
where Qt =
Qt
j=1
 
1 +
umj

 1
and Q0 = 1.
Similarly, combining the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative domestic
household with that of the government, we obtain the intertemporal resource constraint for
the whole small open economy:
1X
t=0
t

ct + gt + ( 1bFt )  ztht

=   1
p0
1X
t=0
Qt( 1BFt ); (19)
where  1BFt = 1 B
G
t   1 BPt , and  1bFt = 1 bGt   1 bPt . The superscript F means that the
bond is traded with the international investors.
2.2 OMFP with Commitment
Proposition 1 Under the condition that Ramsey governments commit to the announced
policy, a Ramsey real allocation problem is to choose a constant  [i.e., constant consump-
tion, a point that can be seen from Eq. (17)], an initial price level p0, and a sequence of
fmt+1; htg1t=0 to maximize the representative household's lifetime utility:
u

c();
M 1
p0
; h0

+
1X
t=1
tu (c();mt; ht) ; (20)
subject to Eqs. (18) and (19), given the initial money stock, M 1, the initial real debt,
( 1bGt )
1
t=0, ( 1b
F
t )
1
t=0, the initial nominal debt, ( 1B
G
t )
1
t=0 and ( 1B
F
t )
1
t=0, and the exogenous
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processes fzt; gtg1t=0.
Proof The proof is standard. The key is to show that when governments commit to the
announced policy, a sequence fct;mt+1, and htg1t=0 satisfy Eqs. (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9),
(10), (13), and (14), if and only they satisfy Eqs. (18) and (19).
Let G0 and 
E
0 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with Eq. (18), the t = 0 govern-
ment's intertemporal budget constraint, and Eq. (19), the economy's intertemporal budget
constraint, respectively. G represents the marginal public nancing cost while E denotes
the marginal external nancing cost. Then the optimality condition with respect to  is:
1X
t=0
tuct
@c
@
= E0
1X
t=0
t
@c
@
  G0
( 1X
t=0
t(ztht   gt   1 bGt )
)
+
E0
p0
1X
t=1
( 1BFt )
@Qt
@
+
G0
p0
(" 1X
t=0
Qt( 1BGt ) +M 1
#
+ 
1X
t=1
( 1BGt )
@Qt
@
)
: (21)
Eq. (21) is a single equation. The lefthand side represents the marginal cost in terms of
utility due to an increase of . Intuitively, when it becomes more expensive to borrow to
smooth consumption, the representative household will decrease its consumption in each
period. The foregone discounted present value of utility due to the decrease in consumption
is the marginal cost of the change in . The righthand side of Eq. (21) represents the
corresponding marginal benet, which contains four components: the rst represents the
increased discounted present value utility if the economy's intertemporal resource constraint
is relaxed due to the decrease of consumption; the second represents the discounted present
value disutility when the government's intertemporal budget constraint is relaxed for the
same reason; the third component is the marginal benet caused by the change in the
discounted present value of outstanding external debt; and the last component comes from
the associated change in the discounted present value of outstanding public debt.
The optimality condition with respect to mt is:
umt =  G0 (ummtmt + umt) +
G0 
tp0
1X
s=t
( 1BGs )
@Qs
@mt
+
E0
tp0
1X
s=t
( 1BFs )
@Qs
@mt
; t  1:
(22)
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Eq. (22) denotes a system of equations. Its left-hand side represents the marginal cost in
utility if real money balances decrease. The righthand side represents the corresponding
marginal benet in utility, which has three sources: the rst source is the relaxing of the
government's intertemporal budget constraint; the second is the change in the discounted
present value public bonds due to the change in nominal interest rates; and the last source
comes from the change in external nancing due to the change in nominal interest rates.
The optimality condition with respect to ht is:
 uht = G0 (zt + uhhtht + uht) + E0 zt; t  0: (23)
Eq. (23) also denotes a system of equations. It shows that optimal work hours is determined
by equating the marginal benet with the marginal cost. This optimality condition has the
same components as the corresponding optimality condition in the closed economy. The only
dierence is that here the Lagrange multiplier in the second component of the right-hand
side of Eq. (23) is the multiplier for the intertemporal budget constraint, while in the closed
economy the corresponding multiplier is for the within-period resource constraint.
The optimality condition with respect to p0 is:
um0M 1 = G0 
" 1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BGt

+M 1
#
+ E0
1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BFt

: (24)
Eq. (24) is a single equation. There is a marginal benet in utility due to an increase in
the price level since ination reduces the outstanding nominal pubic debt and the external
debt. This marginal benet is given by the righthand side of Eq. (24). There is also an
associated marginal cost in utility due to an increase in the price level since ination erodes
real money balances. In the equilibrium, this marginal cost exactly osets the marginal
benet in equilibrium.
Denition 2 A Ramsey equilibrium is dened as a choice of (, p0, fhtg1t=0, fmt+1g1t=0)
satisfying Eqs. (18), (19), (21), (22), (23), and (24), given the initial asset positions,
f 1BGt ,  1BFt ,  1bGt ,  1bFt g1t=0 and M 1, and the exogenous processes fzt; gtg1t=0.
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2.3 OMFP with Discretion
We follow the same methodology as in the literature to discuss the time consistency property
of OMFP. According to the methodology, the time consistency problem becomes whether
the t = 0 government can nd Lagrange multipliers, G1 and 
E
1 and a prole f0BGt , 0BFt ,
0b
G
t , 0b
F
t g1t=1, such that the policy continuation of the t=0 government satisfy the optimality
conditions of the t = 1 government [Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson et al. (2006), and
Alvarez et al. (2004)]. The policy continuation of the t = 0 government refers to the t = 0
government's optimal choices, ; ht ;m

t+1; p

1.
7 The optimality conditions of the t = 1
government are the one-period ahead updated version of the optimality conditions of the
t = 0 government.8 If Lagrange multipliers and a prole exist, OMFP is time consistent;
otherwise, it is time inconsistent.
In this section, we discuss the time consistency of OMFP when the government commits
to a exible FERR. Since the discussion of time consistency uses all the relevant optimality
conditions, it does not matter the order of those conditions in our discussion. Given our
model setup, we analyze the solution to the Lagrange multipliers rst and then the prole.
Note that Persson et al. (2006) discuss the prole rst then the Lagrange multipliers. In
addition, we assume the Ramsey equilibrium exists and is unique in our economy throughout
the paper, an implicit assumption in those cited papers.
One thing worth emphasizing is that our discussion does not depend on whether issued
bonds are denominated in domestic currency or in foreign currency (such as US$). The
reason is as follows. (1) We can interpret real bonds denominated in US$ as real bonds
denominated in domestic currency. To see this, note that b??t =
B??t
p??
= BtS
p??
= Bt
pt
= bt, the
rst equality comes from the non-arbitrage condition in the foreign bond market, the second
equality comes from the non-arbitrage condition across borders, the third equality comes from
the law of one-price, and the last equality comes from the non-arbitrage condition in the
domestic bond market. (2) We can also interpret nominal bonds denominated in US$ as real
bonds denominated in local currency but inated by the foreign price, B??t = b
??
t p
?? = btp
??.
7To make the discussion as clear as possible, the policy continuation will be represented by a superscript
of .
8The optimality conditions of the t = 1 government are available upon request.
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(3) Since p?? is exogenous and our discussion includes bt, our result does not depend on
whether the issued bonds are denominated in domestic currency or in US$.
2.3.1 Restriction on Financing Costs Imposed by the Labor Market
The one-period ahead version Eq. (23) is a system of linear equations with two unknowns
- two Lagrange multipliers. It is convenient to use the version of Eq. (23) to discuss the
solution to the two Lagrange multipliers, i.e, the restriction on the nancing costs imposed
by the labor market. Dene
t;s =
0@ zt + uhhtht + uht zt
zs + uhhsh

s + u

hs zs
1A ;8t; s  1 and t 6= s:
We have the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, Svensson timing of
markets, and time varying productivity, both public and external marginal nancing costs
should be constant across governments in order to have time consistent optimal policy of
hours when t;s; 8t; s  1 and t 6= s is not singular. Both public and external marginal
nancing costs could vary across governments when t;s; 8t; s  1 and t 6= s is singular.
Proof Here is the scratch of proof. The optimality conditions respect to hours for the t = 1
government is given by:
G1 (
zt + uhhth

t + u

ht) + 
E
1 zt =  uht;8t  1: (25)
Eq. (25) represents a system of linear equations with two unknowns, G1 and 
E
1 , and an
innite number of linear equations. Note that the t = 0 government has the similar optimality
conditions
G0 (
zt + uhhth

t + u

ht) + 
E
0 zt =  uht;8t  1:
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Thus, for any two periods, t and s, we have the following
t;s
0@ G1
E1
1A =
0@  uht
 uhs
1A  t;s
0@ G0
E0
1A ;8t; s  1 and t 6= s: (26)
From Eq. (26), when the matrix t;s is non-singular, the Lagrange multipliers are uniquely
determined in order to have time consistency:
G1 = 
G
0 = ^
G;E1 = 
E
0 = ^
E: (27)
When the matrix t;s is singular, the Lagrange multipliers are not uniquely determined by
the labor-leisure choice. 
By choosing the same Lagrange multipliers, we can guarantee that the policy continuation
of hours will satisfy Eq. (25). The choice of constant Lagrange multipliers in Eq. (27) is
a very strong result. Intuitively, the constant costs result comes from the special feature in
the small open economy. According to Eqs. (23) and (25), optimal policy of hours in the
Ramsey problem are determined by the period productivity and the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the two intertemporal budget constrants. Given that the t = 0 government
and the t = 1 government face the same ow of time-varying productivity, if the Lagrange
multipliers are dierent, the t = 1 government will deviate from the policy continuation of
hours if t;s;8t; s  1 and t 6= s is not singular. In other words, governments want to keep
the marginal nancing costs constant over time in order to have time consistent optimal
policy of hours. In the context of this small open economy, the constant marginal nancing
costs do not imply constant labor income tax rates (one for each period), because hours can
change over time. The constant marginal nancing costs also do not imply constant nominal
interest rates because real money balances can change over time.
When the matrix t;s is singular, the labor-leisure choices do not impose restrictions such
that the Lagrange multipliers may not be uniquely determined by Eq. (25) alone. There are
two sucient conditions for t;s to be singular, which is given by:
Proposition 3 When separable preferences have uhhh
uh
=   and/or the total factor produc-
tivity is constant over time, t;s;8t; s  1 and t 6= s is singular.
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Proof The rst sucient condition for t;s to be singular is a condition on preferences:
uhhh
uh
=  ; (28)
where  is an integer. Under this condition, we have the following
 uht = G0 [zt   (   1)uht] + E0 zt; 8t  1;
) uht =
G0 
zt + E0 zt
(   1)G0   1
:8t  1;
Thus, we have:
t;s =
0@ zt   ( 1)(G0 zt+E0 zt)( 1)G0  1 zt
zs   ( 1)(
G
0 
zs+E0 zs)
( 1)G0  1
zs
1A ) t;s = 0;8t; s  1 and t 6= s:
The second sucient condition is a condition on productivity which is given by:
zt  z; (29)
where z is a constant. With constant z, the system of equations reduces to one single
equation and t;s is clearly singular. It is worth noting that when t;s is singular, the
Lagrange multipliers are subject to one linear equation even though they are not uniquely
determined.
In the closed economy, the labor market does not impose any restrictions on the time
consistency property of OMFP. To see this, note that the relevant optimality condition
becomes
G1 (u

ctzt + u

hhth

t + u

ht) + 
E
1tzt =  uht;8t  1: (30)
where E1t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period resource constraint in
period t. After the Ramsey government chooses the value for G1 , 
E
1t will adjust in such
a way that policy continuation of hours will automatically satisfy Eq. (30). For this very
reason, Persson et al. (2006) skip the discussion on the eect of the labor-leisure choice on
17
the time consistency of OMFP.
2.3.2 Time Inconsistency with Non-singular t;s
When the nancing costs are constant across governments, OMFP is not time consistent.
The result is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, with separable pref-
erences, with Svensson timing of markets, and a exible FERR, OMFP is time inconsistent
if t;s is not singular. This result is independent of the time-varying government expenditure
process and the initial asset position.
Proof The key is to show that we cannot nd a prole X1 = f0BGt , 0BFt , 0bGt , 0bFt g1t=1 such
that policy continuation of the t = 0 government will satisfy the optimality conditions of
the t = 1 government's Ramsey problem. For that purpose, it is sucient to show the non-
existence of X2 = f0BG2 , 0BF2 g. Two equations are crucial. One is the optimality condition
with respect to consumption, and the other is the optimality condition with respect to money
balances in period t = 2. With some manipulation, we obtain the following equations
^EA2
 
0B
F
2

+ ^GA2
 
0B
G
2

= D^31; (31)
^EQ12
 
0B
F
2

+ ^GQ12
 
0B
G
2

= D^32;2; (32)
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where
Q1t =
tY
j=2

1 +
umj

 1
;
At = Q
1
t
"
tX
i=2
umi
( + umi)
#
;
D31 = p

1
   ^E
1  

@c
@

  p1^G
" 1X
t=1
t 1
uht

ht +
1X
t=2
t 1
umt

mt
#
;
D32;t = ^
Gmt
t 1p1 (
 + umt) +
umt
 
1 + ^G

t 1p1 (
 + umt)
ummt
;
D^31 = D31  
1X
t=3
At
Q1t
(D32;t 1  D32;t) ;
D^32;2 = D32;2  D32;3:
Eq. (31) is the t = 1 government's optimality condition with respect to consumption and Eq.
(32) is the t = 1 government's optimality condition with respect to real money balance in
period t = 2. Note that under the condition that t;s is not singular (which is the case here),
Eq. (27) must hold. For this reason, we put a hat on top of the two Lagrange multipliers.
Thus, there are two unknowns, 0B
G
2 and 0B
F
2 , in two linear equations, Eqs. (31) and (32).
The rest of the variables are functions of policy continuation and the pinned down Lagrange
multipliers. One implicit assumption is that the values of all these terms are nite.
There is no solution to this system. To see this, simply check Eq. (31) and Eq. (32). it is
clear that the solution to
 
0B
F
2

and
 
0B
G
2

exists only if the ratio of D^31=D^32;2 is the same
as the ratio of A2=Q
1
2. Since both ratios are functions of pre-determined variables, thus no
solution exists and OMFP is time inconsistent.
Note that we have applied a \pre-determined argument": if two ratios are pre-determined,
they are generally not equal. Even though this pre-determined argument is not standard, it
has been used in the literature, for example, Uribe (2006).
From Eqs. (31) and (32), consumption and real money balance in period t = 2 are
determined by three components: the forward looking component,

D^31 and D^32;2

, the
history component, [
 
0B
F
2

and
 
0B
G
2

], and the present component,
 
E and G

. In our
time-varying economy, it is generally true that the forward looking component to the t = 1
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government is dierent from that to the t = 0 government. Hence, to have the t = 1
government to follow the t = 0 government's choice of consumption and real money balance
in period t = 2, the t = 0 government must choose an appropriate combination of the
history component and the present component. However, the history component imposes
a singularity in the system of two equations, Eqs. (31) and (32) if the present component
had been pinned down by the labor-leisure choices. Thus, to turn-around the singularity
problem imposed by the history component, the present component must be time-varying.
In other words, the good market and the money market ask that nancing costs vary across
government in order to have time consistency.
Put it together, when t;s is not singular, there are two forces in this small open economy
that are important with respect to time consistency of OMFP. One force, which arises from
the labor market when t;s is not singular, asks for constant external and public nancing
costs across government in order to have time consistency. The other force, which arises from
the good market and the money market, asks for time-varying external and public nancing
costs across governments. They clearly contradict to each other. As a result, OMFP is time
inconsistent.
2.3.3 Time Inconsistency with Singular t;s
When Lagrange multipliers are not uniquely determined by the time consistency require-
ment in the labor market, i.e., t;s is singular, the force asking for constant nancing costs
disappears. Therefore, OMFP becomes time consistent and many maturity structures of
public debt and external debt are capable of rendering OMFP time consistent. Proposition
5 summarizes this nding:
Proposition 5 In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, separable preferences,
with Svensson timing of markets, and a exible FERR, OMFP is time consistent if t;s is
singular. This result is independent of the time-varying government expenditure process, and
the initial asset position of the government. Further, there are many maturity structures of
bonds that are capable of rendering OMFP time consistent.
Proof We prove Proposition 5 by construction as in the literature [Alvarez et al. (2004)
and Persson et al. (2006)]. To proceed, we leave the Lagrange multipliers undetermined and
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make the following arbitrary assumptions to facilitate the discussion:
(0b
F
t ) = (0b^
F
t ); t  2; (0bGt ) = (0b^Gt ); t  1; (0BGt ) = (0B^Gt ); t  3: (33)
where the variables (0b^
F
t ), (0b^
G
t ), and (0B^
G
t ) denote the values arbitrarily chosen for (0b
F
t ),
(0b
G
t ), and (0B
G
t ), respectively. There are two layers of arbitrary assumptions here. First,
the values for these bond holding positions are arbitrary. Second, the format of assumption
(33) itself is arbitrary in the sense that we can interchange the superscript of G by F and
vice versa across time.
The choice that the arbitrary values for (0b
F
t ) and (0b
G
t ) include all the values after t = 2
reects that the maturity structure of real bonds is indeterminate (a result directly coming
from the fact that real interest rates are exogenous to this small open economy). Further,
the arbitrary values for (0b
G
t ) actually start at t = 1. This is due to the equivalence between
(0b
G
1 ) and (0B
G
1 ) that occurs if the t = 1 government follows the policy continuation. This
point will become evident in the following steps.
Assumption (33) is of interest because it applies to the case in which the t = 0 government
has the maximum number of degrees of freedom in choosing the maturity structure of nominal
bonds in order to render time consistent OMFP. In fact, this assumption says that the
t = 0 government only needs to pay attention to two multiple-period public bond, and the
government is free in choosing all other nominal public bonds.
We start with the optimality condition with respect to real money balances
1X
s=t
E1Q
1
s
 
0B
F
s

+
1X
s=t
G1 
Q1s
 
0B
G
s

= ~D32;t; t  2 (34)
Here we replace the f^E; ^Gg in D32;t with fE1 ; G1 g to obtain ~D32;t. Given the undetermined
Lagrange multipliers, subtracting Eq. (34) held at t = S from the equation (34) held at
t = S + 1 produces the following equation involving (0B
F
S ) and (0B
G
S ):
E1Q
1
S(0B
F
S ) + 
G
1 Q
1
S(0B
G
S ) = ~D32;S   ~D32;S+1; S  2: (35)
Eq. (35) is the only generic restriction on the maturity structure of nominal bonds. It shows
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that if the government wants to decrease government nancing by one unit, it must increase
external nancing by G=E units. The economic interpretation of Eq. (35) is that once
the t = 1 government follows the policy continuation, it does not care about the particular
source of nancing. Eq. (35) and assumption (33) are sucient to pin down (0B
F
S ) and
(0B
G
S ) for any S  3 as functions of the undetermined Lagrange multipliers.
We then rewrite Eqs. (21) and (22) at t = 2 as
E1A2
 
0B
F
2

+ G1 
A2
 
0B
G
2

= ~D31; (36)
E1Q
1
2
 
0B
F
2

+ G1 
Q12
 
0B
G
2

= ~D32;2   ~D32;3; (37)
Here we replace the f^E; ^Gg in D^31 with fE1 ; G1 g to obtain ~D31. We can get rid of (0BG2 )
and (0B
F
2 ) to obtain one equation with the two undetermined Lagrange multipliers:
0 = Q12 ~D31   A2

~D32;2   ~D32;3

; (38)
Note that ~D31, ~D32;2, and ~D32;3 are functions of the undetermined Lagrange multipliers. Eq.
(38) with the linear restriction from the labor market are two linear equations with two
unknowns, the undetermined Lagrange multipliers. It is straightforward to see that there is
no singularity issue here and we can thus solve for the Lagrange multipliers.
There are three more conditions to use. They are the government intertemporal budget
constraint, the economy intertemporal resource constraint, and the optimality condition with
respect to the initial price level. For convenience, we list them below
1X
t=1
Q1t
 
0B
G
t

+ p1
1X
t=1
t
 
0b
G
t

= D39 (39)
1X
t=1
Q1t
 
0B
F
t

+ p1
1X
t=1
t
 
0b
F
t

= D40 (40)
E1
1X
t=1
Q1t
 
0B
F
t

+ G1 

1X
t=1
Q1t
 
0B
G
t

= um1M

0   G1 M0 ; (41)
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where
D39 = p

1
1X
t=1
t 1

(zth

t   gt) +
uht

ht

+ p1
1X
t=2
t 1
umt

mt  M0
D40 = p

1
1X
t=1
t 1 [ztht   c()  gt] :
After (0B
F
S ) and (0B
G
S ) for all S  2 and Lagrange multipliers are solved, Eq. (39) is an
equation in one unknown (0B
G
1 ) given assumption (33). This construction of (0B
G
1 ) shows
that there is one-to-one relation between (0B
G
1 ) and (0b
G
1 ). The t = 1 government has a
degree of freedom to choose one of these two, and once the value for (0b
G
1 ) is chosen, a
corresponding value for (0B
G
1 ) is determined by following the above steps.
We plug the solutions of (0B
F
S ); S  2 and (0BGS ); S  1, into Eq. (41), and solve for
(0B
F
1 ). The t = 0 government has to choose (0B
F
1 ) in such a way that, under assumption (33),
the benet of surprise ination is completely neutralized by the cost of surprise ination.
Finally, we plug all the solved optimal bond holding positions into Eq. (40) to solve for (0b
F
1 ).
This shows that under assumption (33), the choice of (0b
F
1 ) has to satisfy the intertemporal
budget constraint of the t = 1 economy.
It can be shown that the constructed maturity structure of bonds is consistent with
the t = 0 government's intertemporal budget constraint and with the t = 0 economy's
intertemporal budget constraint.9 Thus, we construct a maturity structure of bonds and a
solution to the Lagrange multipliers under arbitrary assumption (33). With the constructed
maturity structure of bonds and the solution to the Lagrange multipliers, OMFP is time
consistent because the policy continuation satises the optimality conditions of the t = 1
government. Since assumption (33) is arbitrary, we can change the values in that assumption
to construct dierent maturity structures of bonds and dierent solutions for the Lagrange
multipliers, which will together make the OMFP time consistent.
One related question is about the horizon of the bonds. The question is of interest
because for the given the general solution, any supportive maturity structure of bonds will
potentially be over the innite horizon. However, this nding cannot be useful from the
9The proof is available upon request.
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central bankers' point of view because it is impossible to design and organize a maturity
structure of bonds over the innite horizon. Here is the result:
Corollary 1 When OMFP is time consistent, the time horizon of both public bonds and
external bonds to guarantee time consistent OMFP can be nite.
Proof To see this, assume the t = 0 government inherits nominal bonds over nite horizon
of  periods, where   3. Thus the optimality conditions with respect to any ms, where
s  + 1, can be rewritten as:
ums
 
1 + G

=  Gmsumms; s  + 1 (42)
From Eq. (42), all the ms, where s  +1, are the same. Thus, the t = 0 government can set
all the public and external bonds matured after the +1 period at zero. It is straightforward
to show that these zero bonds satisfy the t = 1 government's optimality conditions with
respect to real money balance, Eq. (34), for all the periods after the  + 1 period. For the
rest bonds, the t = 0 government can follow the above steps to nd a maturity structure of
bonds to render the OMFP time consistent.
3 Time Inconsistency under A Fixed FERR
The research following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) argues
that a credible xed FERR helps solve the time inconsistent problem while a exible FERR
is likely to render policy time-inconsistent. One relevant question this paper answers is
whether such a claim holds in a small open economy version of those closed economy model
in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Alvarez et al. (2004) and Persson et al. (2006).
When the government commits to the xed FERR, i.e., St  S, the monetary economy
eectively becomes a real economy. There are several signicant changes. First, it  i??,
a feature meaning that the government loses its control over monetary policy, as predicted
by the impossible trinity theorem established in the Mundell-Fleming model. Second, pt 
Sp??, a feature implying that p0 is not a choice variable in the corresponding Ramsey real
allocation problem. Third, Qt  (1+i??) t, a feature indicating that nominal bonds (external
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and public) of dierent maturity dates are not eective policy instruments any more. Put
it dierently, only the total bond holding position,
P1
t=0Qt
 
 1BGt

=
P1
t=0 (i
??) t
 
 1BGt

and
P1
t=0Qt
 
 1BFt

=
P1
t=0 (i
??) t
 
 1BFt

, matters in the discussion of time consistency.10
Besides, when Qt is fully determined by i
??, it will be independent of  and mt.
Thus, the intertemporal budget constraints are rewritten as:
BGt =
1X
t=0
t [(ztht   gt) + uhtht] +
1X
t=1
tumtmt   M 1
p??
; (43)
BFt =
1X
t=0
t [ct + gt   ztht] ; (44)
where
BGt =
1
p??
1X
t=0
(i??) t
 
 1BGt

+
1X
t=0
t( 1bGt )
BFt =  
1
p??
1X
t=0
(i??) t ( 1BFt ) 
1X
t=0
t( 1bFt ):
The Ramsey real allocation problem under commitment becomes:
Proposition 6 Under the condition that Ramsey governments commit to the announced pol-
icy, a Ramsey real allocation problem is to choose a constant  and a sequence of fmt+1; htg1t=0
to maximize the representative household's lifetime utility:
u

c();
M 1
p??
; h0

+
1X
t=1
tu (c();mt; ht) ;
subject to Eqs. (43) and (44), given the initial money stock, M 1, the initial real debt,
( 1bGt )
1
t=0, ( 1b
F
t )
1
t=0, the initial nominal debt, ( 1B
G
t )
1
t=0 and ( 1B
F
t )
1
t=0, and the exogenous
processes fzt; gtg1t=0.
Following the same procedures in the case of exible FERR, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 7 In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, with separable pref-
erences, with Svensson timing of markets, and a xed FERR, OMFP is time inconsistent if
10Again, those exogenous variables with ?? could be time-varying.
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t;s is not singular. This result is independent of the government expenditure process and
the initial asset position.
Proof The proof is similar to that in the case of a exible FERR. First, to have time
consistency, we have Eq. (26); i.e., the labor market will ask for constant nancing costs
across governments if t;s is not singular and will not ask for constant nancing costs across
governments if if t;s is singular.
Second, the good market will still ask for time-varying nancing costs across governments.
To see this, note that the optimality condition with respect to  for the t = 1 government is
1X
t=1
t 1uct
@c
@
= E1
1X
t=1
t 1
@c
@
  G1
1X
t=1
t 1(ztht   gt  0 bGt )
+
G1
p??
" 1X
t=1
(i??) t (0BGt ) +M 1
#
: (45)
In Eq. (45), (1)  is a structural parameter, and p??, i??, zt, and gt are exogenous. (2) uct,
ht,
@c
@
are evaluated at the policy continuation to have time consistency. (3) The sum ofP1
t=1 
t 1(0bGt ) and
1
p??
P1
t=1 (i
??) t (0BGt ) is predetermined by the period budget constraint
of the t = 0 government. To see this, just check the one-period ahead version of Eq. (43). It
immediately follows that the sum is predetermined with the real allocations are evaluated at
the policy continuation and the Lagrange multipliers are uniquelly determined. Thus, if t;s
is not singular, then Lagrange multipliers are uniquely determined by the labor-leisure choices
and both sides of Eq. (45) are pre-determined. In this case, OMFP is time inconsistent.
Similarly, we can show that when t;s is singular, OMFP will be time consistent.
Intuitively, unless certain conditions such that t;s is singular hold, the two main forces
will remain when the FERR changes from a exible FERR to a xed FERR. The two forces
impose opposite restrictions on nancing costs, which leads to time consistency of OMFP.
If we follow the literature by using the counting method initially proposed in Tinbergen
(1956) and formally presented in Alvarez et al. (2004), the same main conclusion of time
inconsistency will be obtained. In particular, when the FERR becomes a xed FERR, the
t = 1 government will not have control over it in each period. This means that the t = 0
government has one less policy choice in each period to inuence. On the other hand, the
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nominal external and public bonds become ineective policy instruments. This means that
the t = 0 has two less policy instruments to use in each period. Given that OMFP is time
inconsistent with a exible FERR, OMFP will be time inconsistent when the FERR changes
from a exible FERR to a xed FERR because the government loses more policy instruments
than the decrease of policy choices during the change.
Note that with a xed FERR, the monetary economy eectively becomes a real economy
and OMFP essentially becomes optimal scal policy. It is thus not of surprise to get time-
inconsistent optimal scal policy in this paper, the same conclusion obtained in Persson
and Svensson (1986). There are several dierences between this paper and Persson and
Svensson (1986). First, Persson and Svensson (1986) focus on how the trade-o between
tax distortions and wealth eects in each period aects the cost of public funds; while our
paper focus on how the labor market and the good (money) market(s) impose the costs
of public funds and external funds. Second, because of the dierent methods, this paper
identify certain conditions under which optimal scal policy could be time consistent in a
small open economy; while Persson and Svensson (1986) simply use the counting method and
thus have ignored those conditions. Nevertheless, the main conclusion is the same: optimal
scal policy is in general time inconsistent.
We summarized the result with a xed FERR below:
Proposition 8 It is generally impossible to have xed FERR, perfect capital mobility, and
time consistent OMFP at the same time in a small open economy.
This nding is empirically relevant and has the potential in explaining the recent sovereign
debt crisis in Greece. The crisis is the outcome of a burst of the scal problem accumulated in
Greece over time, which is in line with Proposition 8. This is also a new result. Even though
the monetary policy is time consistent (because monetary policy is not independent anymore)
when the xed FERR is credible, OMFP is time inconsistent because the government does
not have sucient policy instruments. Our new result complements the nding in Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) in the following sense: credible rules
may help render certain policy time consistent; but at the same time, they also lead to
time inconsistency of other policies. Note that Proposition 8 is dierent from the impossible
trinity theorem, which states that it is impossible to have the xed FERR, perfect capital
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mobility, and an independent monetary policy at the same time. Instead, Proposition 8
states that OMFP is time inconsistent if the government commits to a xed FERR and
capital is perfectly mobile. Note that our conclusion is weaker because the result builds on
that t;s is not singular.
4 Relation to the Literature
If we dene Lagrange multipliers as implicit policy instruments and bonds of dierent ma-
turity dates as explicit policy instrument, time consistency of OMFP hinges on whether
the t = 0 government has sucient eective implicit policy instruments and more eective
explicit policy instruments than the t = 1 government has policy choices. In turns out that
the answer is generally no. The reason is that there are two forces in this economy and
they generally impose opposite restrictions on the nancing costs. The force from the labor
market asks for constant nancing costs across governments while the force from the good
market and the money market asks for time-varying nancing costs across governments. The
t = 0 government could not nd Lagrange multipliers to satisfy the opposite requirements
due to two forces. As a result, OMFP is time inconsistent. When certain conditions are
satised, the force asking for constant nancing costs will disappears and OMFP will become
time consistent. In this case, many maturity structures are capable of rendering OMFP time
consistent becasue the t = 0 government always has more explicit policy instruments than
the t = 1 government has policy choices.
The intuition is dierent from that in closed economies. In a closed economy, the labor-
leisure choices do not impose any restriction on the time consistency of OMFP. This is
because there is a Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint in each period. These
period multipliers will adjust in order to accommodate the uctuations in the labor market.
In other words, the government in a closed economy will always have sucient eective
implicit policy instruments. Moreover, OMFP is always time consistent because Ramsey
governments always have a sucient number of explicit policy instruments [Alvarez et al.
(2004) and Persson et al. (2006)]. For more about the literature, please see these cited
references.
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5 Conclusion
This paper makes a small step in exploring the time consistency problem in a small open econ-
omy. We show that OMFP is generally time inconsistent, a result independent of FERRs.
Furthermore, OMFP is time consistent only if preferences and/or productivity satisfy certain
properties. Even though these identied sucient conditions are new to the literature, they
should be interpreted with caution. First, one sucient condition, constant productivity,
for time consistency is clearly too restrictive. Another sucient condition, Eq. (29), show
the time-consistency is partially determined by the preferences of households. It raises con-
cern about the robustness of our results. This is because we obtain the ndings on time
consistency of OMFP under the assumption of separable preferences. When preferences are
non-separable, the time-consistency problem will be analyzed in a complicated system, which
is out of the scope of this paper.
In addition, we show in a simple model that the commitment to the xed FERR does not
help render OMFP time consistent, not to mention that the credibility of the xed exchange
rate commitment itself. This result clearly extends our understanding between the credibility
of a xed FERR and time consistency of OMFP.
Although intuitive, our results are still preliminary in the sense that they are far from
useful for the quantitative analysis in this important eld. Nevertheless, our results point
out one important extension for future research to pursue Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)'s
claim that \the most urgent step ... is to characterize credible policy ...". In particular, our
results, combined with that in Persson and Svensson (1986), implies that future research
about optimal monetary and scal policy in a small open economy should focus on time
consistent discretionary policy rather than Ramsey policy under commitment.
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A Appendix - Not for Publication
A.1 Optimality conditions of the t=1 government
Dene Qt =
Qt
j=1
 
1 +
umj

 1
. For convenience, the optimality conditions of the t = 0
government are given below. This rst is the government budget constraint:

p0
" 1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BGt

+M 1
#
=
1X
t=0
t

(ztht   gt   1 bGt ) + uhtht

+
1X
t=1
tumtmt;
(46)
The second is the economy budget constraint:
1X
t=0
t

ct + gt + ( 1bFt )  ztht

=   1
p0
1X
t=0
Qt( 1BFt ); (47)
The third is the rst order condition with respect to consumption:
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@c
@
= E0
1X
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t
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@
  G0
( 1X
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E0
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@
+
G0
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(" 1X
t=0
Qt( 1BGt ) +M 1
#
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( 1BGt )
@Qt
@
)
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The fourth is the rst order condition with respect to money balance:
umt =  G0 (ummtmt + umt) +
G0 
tp0
1X
s=t
( 1BGs )
@Qs
@mt
+
E0
tp0
1X
s=t
( 1BFs )
@Qs
@mt
; t  1:
(49)
The fth is the rst order condition with respect to hours:
 uht = G0 (zt + uhhtht + uht) + E0 zt; t  0: (50)
The last is the rst order condition with respect to P0:
um0M 1 = G0 
" 1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BGt

+M 1
#
+ E0
1X
t=0
Qt
 
 1BFt

: (51)
A.2 Optimality conditions of the t=1 government
For convenience, the optimality conditions of the t = 1 government in the same order as in
the case of the t = 0 government. However, we write them in a dierent format in order to
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facilitate the discussion on time consistency:
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A.3 Liquidity constraint
Here we use some simplied notations, such as
bG0 =
1X
s=0
s( 1bGs ); b
G
1 =
1X
s=1
s 1(0bGs );
bF0 =
1X
s=0
s( 1bFs ); b
F
1 =
1X
s=1
s 1(0bFs ):
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The intertemporal budget constraint of the t = 0 government is given by
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The intertemporal budget constraint of the t = 1 government is given by
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
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Here we want to show that given that the policy continuation satises the t = 1 govern-
ment's budget constraint, the constructed maturity structure of bonds is consistent with
the intertemporal budget constraint of the t = 0 government. Let's start with the t = 0
government's period budget constraint,
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Substituting into the t = 0 government's intertemporal budget constraint:
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Now given that 1
1+i1
= q1=p1
q0=p0
= p0
p1
, and Qt = Q1;t=(1 + i1), then we have:
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This is the t = 1 government's intertemporal budget constraint. We simplify this budget
constraint as follows
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Similarly, it can be shown that the constructed maturity structure of bonds is consistent
with the intertemporal budget constraint of the t = 0 economy.
A.4 What if households do not cooperate?
Several assumptions are crucial to obtain the time consistent result when productivity is
constant. (a) Real interest rates are assumed to be exogenous. This assumption guarantees
that there is no real time inconsistency from the change of real interest rates. It then
follows that the maturity structure of real bonds is indeterminate. (b) Svensson timing is
assumed: the beginning of period money enters the utility function so that there is a direct
cost associated with surprise ination. This Svensson timing mechanism gives governments
freedom in choosing non-zero nominal bonds to smooth household consumption. It is thus
the case that governments have far more nominal instruments to choose than the nominal
choices they want to inuence. And (c) domestic households are assumed to coordinate fully,
which aords the government full control in choosing the level of external debt. In the next,
we discuss the case when the assumption (c) does not hold.
Assumption (c) is strong and debatable: Domestic households make individual choice of
the maturity structure of bonds. Since these individual choices are not based on optimization
behavior, there is no guarantee that after aggregation, the realized maturity structures of
(0B
P
S ) and (0b
P
S) are the same as those implied in Theorem 4, especially when households
respond after the government make the policy announcement. In this case, the only way
to guarantee time consistent optimal choice is for domestic households to have complete
cooperation. Since there is no clear mechanism in the model for household cooperation, it
seems very unlikely that the required complete cooperation will obtain.
However, the government can force domestic households to be cooperative by using asym-
metric taxes. The intuition is that, with asymmetric taxes, households give up their degrees
of freedom in choosing the maturity structure of nominal bonds, which gives the government
control over one or all of f0BPSg1S=2. This brings back to the time consistent optimal policy.
Below we present an example that illustrates how to use asymmetric taxes to bring back
time consistent optimal policy.
Suppose there are N households and that the maturity structure of nominal bonds for
household j, where j 2 (1; 2; 3; :::N), is given by f0BjSg1S=1. The t = 0 government randomly
chooses one household k and collects asymmetric tax  j2 on household purchases of each unit
of
 
0B
j
2

. The tax is asymmetric in the following sense
 j2 = x > 0; if j 6= k
 j2 = 0; if j = k:
Any household j 6= k will set  0Bj2 = 0. This is the case because the household only cares
about the discounted present value of its bond holding positions, and when it sets
 
0B
j
2
 6= 0,
it has to pay a tax xj0Bj2j > 0, which lowers the present value of its asset positions and thus
its utility. Other than
 
0B
j
2

, the household j 6= k is free to choose any maturity structure it
likes as long as its liquidity condition is satised. Household k is also free to choose
 
0B
k
S

for
S  3 (note that  0Bk1 is chosen to satisfy the household's liquidity condition). Household
k's choice of
 
0B
k
2

will become clear below.
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The arbitrary behavior of households leaves the t = 0 government the following restric-
tion:
(0B
P
S ) = (0 ~B
P
S );S  3:
This restriction occurs because (0B
k
1 ) and (0B
k
2 ) have not yet been determined. With this
restriction, we get the government's choice of (0B
G
S ) for S  3 from Eq. (??). Thus, from
Eqs. (36) and (37), the t = 0 government could choose a value for 0B
P
2 =0 B
k?
2 which will
render optimal policy time consistent.
Returning now to household k, this household still has one degree of freedom in choosing 
0B
k
1

and
 
0B
k
2

. If household k chooses
 
0B
k
2 6=0 Bk?2

, then optimal policy is time incon-
sistent and the household, along with other households, will achieve sub-optimal utility. If,
instead, the household chooses
 
0B
k
2 =0 B
k?
2

, then optimal policy is time consistent and the
household, along with other households, obtains the optimal level of utility. As a result,
household k gives up its degree of freedom by choosing
 
0B
k?
2

. The
 
0B
k
1

is chosen accord-
ingly. It is straightforward to show that both the liquidity constraints of all households and
the liquidity constraint of the aggregate economy are satised.
The above example shows how the government can use an asymmetric tax on the pur-
chases of two-period nominal bonds in order to yield a time consistency outcome. This works
because in equilibrium, the asymmetric tax  j2 will never be used and thus have no impact
on the Ramsey equilibrium of this economy. The government can use two or more asymmet-
ric taxes on multi-period nominal bonds to gain control over more
 
0B
P
S

's. This way, the
government not only renders optimal policy time consistent, but also gains degrees of free-
dom in arranging the maturity structure of public debt, which gives the government greater
ability to render optimal policy time consistent than its counterpart in the closed economy.
In the closed economy, there is no role for these asymmetric taxes because households have
to choose what the government supplies.
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